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Abstract: The financial crisis has put pressure on governments throughout the world to reduce deficits
with severe budgetary cuts in many welfare areas by reinforcing the need to modernize social policies
and optimize their effectiveness and efficiency. Social impact bonds (SIBs) have rapidly become
one of the most innovative financial schemes used by governments to privatize the upfront costs of
welfare interventions by reducing taxpayer expenditure. Our analysis focuses on healthcare impact
bonds (HIBs) that correspond to the adaptation of SIBs to health programs and are considered to be
a viable way to fund out-of-pocket and preventive programs, especially considering the recent cuts to
public healthcare expenditure. By using an in-depth qualitative analysis of existing practices based
on a multiple case study approach, this study contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of SIBs for
the future sustainability of welfare systems by proposing reflections and indications for the scalability
and replicability of SIBs. With respect to the existing literature, this paper provides a theorization of
the main scaling ingredients to be considered for the development of the SIB market as a supporting
financial approach for new and emerging welfare needs by also proposing suggestions and insights
and serving as a guide for scholars and practitioners.
Keywords: impact investing; social impact bond(s); healthcare impact bond(s)
1. Introduction
The financial crisis has put pressure on governments throughout the world to reduce deficits
with severe budgetary cuts in many welfare areas by reinforcing the need to modernize social policies,
optimize their effectiveness and efficiency, and the way they are financed [1].
Health protection activities (among other social protections) have been subject to close scrutiny
from policymakers [2] and governments worldwide have increased their interest in outsourcing
the funding and delivery of welfare services with the aim to reduce public expenditure deficits [3].
Public spending on health fell or slowed in many countries between 2007 and 2012. In 2007, on average,
health comprised 13% of total public spending in the European Region while between 2007 and 2011
the health share of public spending fell at some point in many countries [4]. Recently, the Social
Business Initiative of the European Commission and the G8 Social Impact Investment Taskforce have
highlighted the numerous benefits that social finance instruments and mechanisms, especially social
impact bonds (SIBs), could bring to welfare systems.
Considered as an emerging social policy instrument [5] able to fund innovative social programs
while generating profits for investors and savings for governments [6], SIBs have rapidly become one
of the most innovative financing schemes [7]. The origin of SIBs dates back to the introduction of
payment-by-result (PbR) schemes by the UK government in 2009 [3] and appear rooted around the three
typical elements of the New Public Management repertoire: contracting, performance measurement,
and Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) [8,9]. Nevertheless, in contrast to a traditional PbR scheme,
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the financial risks are not placed on the service provider or on the commissioner but are transferred to
the social investors that finance the deal [10].
From a theoretical point of view, SIBs allow the government to privatize the upfront costs of
social interventions and the associated risks by reducing taxpayer expenditure in the short-term as
well as eliminate the risk of public money being spent on initiatives that do not deliver the desired
outcomes [11]. Savings in public sector spending can occur through a reduction in future expenditure
due to the improved effectiveness of an existing service, or through savings related to interventions
that would have otherwise been a lingering problem for governments and taxpayers such as the costs
of welfare provision [12].
During the last few years, SIBs have been used in several countries as a widely hailed financial
innovation for welfare programs [13]. Since the first program launched in Peterbourgh (UK) in 2010,
SIBs have raised a total amount of $431 million through 132 initiatives distributed across 25 countries
(Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cameroon, Congo, Colombia, Germany, Finland,
France, Japan, India, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea,
Sweden, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States) by targeting social issues
such as criminal justice, homelessness, child and family welfare, early childhood education, workforce
development, health, poverty and environments, and adults with complex needs [14].
However, despite this considerable success, previous works have suggested the need for
a systematic analysis of the benefits, costs, risks, and contractual schemes in SIB projects in order
to understand if and how they could effectively contribute to the welfare issues and what the key
dimensions need to be considered for their scalability.
Moving forward from these considerations, this paper intends to contribute to the ongoing
debate on the role of SIBs for the future sustainability of welfare systems by proposing reflections and
indications for their scalability and replicability by using an in-depth analysis of existing practices
trough a multiple case study approach. In doing this, we focused on healthcare impact bonds (HIBs),
which correspond to the adaptation of these current examples of SIBs in recidivism and child removal
into new health programs and interventions [15]. Considered as a viable way to fund out-of-pocket
programs, currently developed HIBs promote preventive programs with the promise of future public
expenditure savings [16].
In particular, HIBs represent an innovative financial approach to fund evidence-based programs,
encourage investments in cost-saving preventive services in order to reduce the need for more costly
remediation, and fill the market gap between the private and public sector [15].
Specifically, this paper provides an overview of the state of the art of the most relevant literature
regarding social impact bonds and a detailed analysis of recent contractual models by focusing on
health protection activities (among other welfare areas) that have been subject to close scrutiny from
policymakers and governments who have increased their interest in outsourcing the funding and
delivery of services with the aim to reduce public expenditure deficits [3,17]. The work was developed
around three main parts: (i) a literature review of academic and practitioner contributions regarding
SIBs; (ii) the analysis of four existing HIBs by using a qualitative approach; and (iii) a conceptual
framework and a roadmap for scalability and replicability.
With respect to the existing literature, this paper provides a theorization of the main scaling
ingredients to be considered for the development of the SIB market as a supporting financial approach
for new and emerging welfare needs. The work contributes to the ongoing debate on the role of private
capital for public services and by focusing on the possibility of alternative sources of funding for welfare
systems by proposing suggestions and insights and serving as a guide for scholars and practitioners.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a literature
overview; then, we present our methodological approach, research design and main findings; and
finally, we conclude by providing a series of enabling factors and discussing the implications of
our study.
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2. Background
Previous works on SIBs have widely recognized that a series of aspects remain to be addressed for
the development of a SIB market that is able to support welfare needs and provide support to public
sustainability issues.
2.1. Collaborations and Contractual Schemes
SIBs embody a cross-sector collaboration in shared value processes in the form of an innovative
partnership for sustainability that can be defined as a public–private, collaborative, and outcome-based
contracts incorporating impact finance logics [18].
The SIB model represents a new PPP approach designed around a series of contracts between the
involved parties in the commissioning and provisioning of social services.
The complex heterogeneity of stakeholders that can be involved in a SIB project has been confirmed
by the different contractual models that have been developed around the globe. From a contractual
point of view, several authors have pointed out that currently, several SIB models exist. In this vein,
Clifford and Jung [13] distinguished between three main models. The first, in which a special purpose
vehicle (SPV) is established as a “core contracting vehicle” that receives funds from the investors,
enters into a contract to deliver public services with the commissioner, and contracts out that delivery
to service providers. The second model is where the SPV is formed, but acts as a contract manager,
with the commissioner entering into a contract directly with the provider; and the third, named as the
managed network, is where a project manager acts as the hub of the network [13]. By reviewing existing
HIBs practices, Fraser et al. [10] highlighted that three different models could be identified: (1) the direct
provider SIB model; (2) SIB with a SPV; and (3) a social investment partnership (SIP) model, where by
using the same SPV, several SIPs can be set up by providing the same service in different places and by
repaying investors by using other performance targets [8]. So and Jagelewski [19] discussed the two
main SIB models (SPV and direct contracting) and clarified that the delivery organization of the SIB
could be arranged through a social service provider or a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that provided
increased flexibility and risk mitigation. In particular, by using the SPV model: (a) the commissioner
contracts for outcomes with the SPV and payments are made directly to the SPV if the scheduled
outcomes are achieved; (b) the SPV contracts the service providers and (eventually) a social finance
intermediary to set out advisories or other kind of services; (c) investors typically invest directly into
the SPV by assuming ownership; (d) the SPV is managed by a board of directors that is comprised of
investor representatives; and (e) the board is in charge of monitoring the SIB program and considers the
service providers directly accountable to the performance standards scheduled in their contracts [19].
2.2. Alignment of Interests and Principal Agent Issues
Usually, SIBs provide additional non-core social services, rather than serving as substitutes for
existing services, and enable innovation in tackling persistent social problems by generating economies
through scaling and the use of effective performance management [20].
The best candidates for this type of funding model are programs with large upfront costs that
serve a large number of people and have a strong evidence base. From the public sector perspective,
the involvement of investors makes SIBs a unique form of public sector contracting that not only offers
risk transfer, but better performance management, resulting in better social outcomes [21].
By using the SIB model, governments are more likely to be willing to spend money on social
or healthcare programs to improve people’s lives by sharing the related risks with the private sector.
A well-defined SIB creates an incentive structure that aligns the interests of governments, investors,
and service providers around the delivery of a pre-agreed set of outcomes [22–24].
The question of the “Alignment of Interests” was further clarified by Maier and Meyer [25],
who highlighted that like any other kind of contract, a SIB could only bring a partial alignment of
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the main actors’ interests due to the outcome-based incentives, as each actor continues to also have
interests that differ from those of the others.
SIBs could potentially exacerbate the public sector’s principal–agent problem, which exists even
in traditional performance-based contracts, where the principal, that is, the public commissioner
issuing and managing the contract, must rely from a distance on its agent by using taxpayer dollars
appropriately (or not) to deliver services effectively (or not) [26].
2.3. Evaluation and Public Savings
Moreover, savings may not be a sure outcome of SIBs relative to other ways of contracting or
delivering a service. Transaction costs associated with a SIB are higher relative to any other funding
option [20,22,27,28]. With regard to transaction costs, Pandey et al. [29] used Spiller’s “transaction cost
theory of regulation (TCR)” framework [30,31], which enables “opening of the black box of regulation”
which governs public–private contracts to underline how public–private contracts also show the
problem of the contractual hazards of governmental opportunism and third-party opportunism.
In a SIB contract, the government’s principal–agent problem will be further stressed by the presence of
an additional layer of agents: the social finance intermediary arranging the initial funding and the
delivery of services [26].
From a governance perspective, McHugh et al. [32] (p. 251) clarified that the absence of
a direct relationship between the service provider and government potentially generated information
asymmetries in favor of the provider by reducing the possibility of government to act in case
of malpractice.
In the SIB model, the desired goals of each party involved could differ from one another.
In particular, by immediately receiving the upfront capital necessary for the delivery of the activities,
the service provider may be less motivated than impact investors to achieve the scheduled outcomes.
On the other hand, socially motivated investors receive their returns only after a rigorous evaluation
of the outcomes achieved by an independent evaluator. Simultaneously, information asymmetries
may occur between the service provider and both investors and commissioners in terms of the
appropriateness of the outcome metric used for the evaluation of success. A SIB contract introduces
new actors into the “commissioner–provider” relationship and establishes new rules for the governance
of specific services, thus distributing risk among actors in new ways [10].
Academics and professionals have widely identified in the development of a set of robust
evaluation models one of the main drivers for the development of the SIB market by suggesting that
further studies are required to investigate critical matters and technical aspects [10,33]. Flynn et al. [34]
and Wilson et al. [35] underlined the general scarcity of successful evaluation practices by noting
the importance of identifying high-quality evaluation approaches. However, measurement is more
than only metrics, and the development of a standard evaluation model should not leave out a clear
understanding of what is important to measure for each stakeholder. In this sense, from a public sector
perspective, the effective evaluation of the level of savings could be done using the value for money
(VFM) approach based on the estimation of the project’s future financial and nonfinancial benefits [36].
VFM was initially developed in the United Kingdom and has been adopted in various forms as part of
the public–private partnerships (PPPs) procurement [37]. The VFM is generally estimated by using
a comparison against a public sector comparator (PSC). Nevertheless, calculating the PSC is further
complicated by the need to estimate and discount the cash flows in addition to calculating the cost of
risks transferred to the private sector [38]. From this perspective, it may not be possible to effectively
assess the claimed benefits of this kind of contract in terms of VFM and the final costs of a SIB contract
may not be completely identified and measured a priori [39].
The concept of VFM is profoundly different depending on whether the public or private sector
is considered. In the public sector, VFM is strongly affected by quality and performance together
with cost minimization, while in the private sector, VFM is driven by profit maximization and all
private stakeholders are driven by risk/return optimization goals [40]. Finally, cost–benefit should be
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considered in designing and implementing SIBs. Cost–benefit analysis seeks to assess the net value
of a policy or project to society as a whole, and the evaluation of nonmarket impacts is an essential
element of the process. The purpose of benefits evaluation is to understand whether an SIB’s benefits
exceed its costs. Generally, benefits can be classified into (i) cashable savings to the commissioner,
(ii) non-cashable benefits to the commissioner, (iii) cashable savings to other public sector bodies,
(iv) non-cashable benefits to other public sector bodies, and (v) social benefits [39,41].
The literature dealing with the financial valuation of SIBs has mainly focused on the posterior
estimation of social impact and on a mere contextual cost–benefit analysis for the public sector,
but a prior financial formulation of these assets would be useful in attracting potential investors [42].
Fraser et al. [10] (p. 14) highlighted the main difficulties in the process evaluations of SIBs such as the
difficulty of agreeing what should be measured, by whom, and how often as well as the time needed
to establish the contracts among the parties, and pointed out the challenges related to the intrinsic
complexity of SIBs, including the novelty of the process and the provision of innovative services.
3. Research Design
3.1. Methodological Approach
This study employed an exploratory and qualitative approach to investigate previous SIB
experiences. In detail, a grounded theory methodology based on multiple case studies [43] is mainly
appropriate for the description of complex contemporary phenomena within their contexts [44] (p. 544)
and for the provision of a unique means of developing theory by utilizing in-depth insights of empirical
phenomena [45]. The grounded theory method offers a logically reliable set of data collection and
analysis procedures aimed to develop theory [46] by facilitating the identification of regular patterns
in data [47]. As clarified by Dooley [48], theory building requires the constant comparison of data and
theory [47] and a process of continuous refinement between theory and practice [49]. In this sense,
case study research, due to the ability to embrace both quantitative and qualitative data, and embrace
multiple research paradigms, can contribute in a holistic way to all phases of theory development [48].
For these reasons, a grounded theory methodology based on multiple case studies (MCS) [43] was used
to analyze four existing HIBs with the aim to provide a unique analysis of the enabling aspects that
allow governments to consider this emerging funding model as a support for their welfare systems.
From a methodological point of view, MCS enable building more robust and generalizable theory than
a single case can [43] and are appropriate for describing complex contemporary phenomena within
their contexts [50].
The sampling method, which can be considered to be a convenience sample, is intended to
maximize efficiency and validity, both internally and externally [51]. External validity (or generalization)
represents one of the main issues in conducting case study research. In this sense, Yin [52] refers to
the term “analytical generalization” to describe the process by which the findings of a case study can
be generalized to build a theory. Moreover, with regard to the sample composition, the following
criteria were considered: (1) scientific interest (each case highlights a specific aspect of the phenomena);
(2) transparency (only cases with adequate availability of information were selected); and (3) reliability
and trustworthiness (only cases with certainty regarding data and information were considered).
The final sample was composed of information-rich cases able to manifest the phenomenon
of interest intensely (but not extremely) [53] and cases were selected for their relevance to the
research purpose.
In selecting our cases, we focused our analysis on HIBs due to fact that, from a welfare perspective,
governments with limited resources frequently reduce healthcare expenditure and particularly their
spending on preventive healthcare with no evident immediate health impact [54].
Moreover, cases were selected by considering the characteristics of the countries in which they have
been developed. In particular, HIB schemes have been currently developed in nine different countries
(Congo, UK, Canada, USA, Australia, Netherlands, Japan, Israel, India, Cameroon, New Zealand),
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but only two (the UK and Canada) have a national health system based on a “single payer” mechanism
and a universal health model, which has led to this particular kind of financial scheme being seen
as a viable alternative to the traditional publicly funded models of service provisions. The selected
sample provides the opportunity to analyze different aspects that can be derived from the projects’
heterogeneity. Table 1 provides an overview of the selected case studies.
Table 1. Selected cases.
SIB Name Country Healthcare Issues Target Population Launch Date Capital Raised
Community
Hypertension
Prevention
Initiative
Canada Hypertension
7000 prehypertensive older
adults (60+) in Toronto
and Vancouver.
October 2016 C$2 M
Mental Health
and Employment
Partnership
UK Mental health andemployment
2500 people with severe
mental illness (typically with
a diagnosis of psychosis,
such as schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, or severe depression
or anxiety) currently in contact
with statutory mental
health services.
January 2016 £0.4 M
Reconnections UK Social isolation
At least 3000 people aged
50 years and over classified on
the UCLA loneliness scale
(a common loneliness measure)
as 8 to 12 (though it is expected
that most clients will be 65+).
July 2015 £0.85 M
Ways to Wellness UK Social prescribing
11,000 people with long-term
health conditions such as lung
disease, diabetes and asthma.
March 2015 £1.7 M
Source: Our elaboration from the Social Finance Database [14].
3.2. Data Sources, Research Protocol and Coding Procedures
Data were drawn from multiple sources (i.e., websites, reports, and secondary sources) with the
main aim of increasing the construct validity by encouraging convergent lines of inquiry [52].
To ensure the reliability of our study, and consequently minimize errors and bias, a research
protocol was designed [52]. The protocol defined our sources of data, our data analysis procedures,
and the reporting outline. Using the research protocol, the data were recorded and examined. Following
the suggestions of Strauss and Corbin [55] and of Nag and Gioia [56], we structured our analysis in
light of both contextual factors (emerging from cases) and prior theorization and by creating a set of
four dimensions of analysis to develop an emergent, inductive model.
As we collected information about our case studies, we also began to analyze them, adhering to
the guidelines specified in our research protocol.
These steps helped to guide the focus of additional data collection [47]. We also cycled between
the consultation with the most relevant literature and data analysis as guides for the development of
our dimensions of analysis. As we discerned information that was similar, we collated them into our
dimensions or sub dimensions of analysis (Figure 1).
As described in Figure 1, in this study, we considered four basic dimensions of analysis in order
to examine and characterize the main aspects that led to the development of SIBs: contractual schemes,
involved parties, financial aspects, and governmental policy/legal framework.
As the within-case analysis proceeded, we also began cross-case analysis, which aimed to compare
emergent similarities or differences. In the second step, we proceeded with the composition of our case
histories [43].
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4. Case Studies
We analyzed four HIBs. The first project (the Heart and Stroke Healthcare Impact Bond)
was launched in Canada in 2016, while the others (Mental Health and Employment Partnership,
Reconnections, and Ways to Wellness) were launched in the UK, which currently represents the country
with the highest number of SIBs initiated. The sections below provide an overvie of our case studies.
4.1. The Heart and Stroke Healthcare Impact Bond
The first Canadian SIB in preventative health was launched in October 2016 by the Public Health
Agency of Canada [57,58]. The H art and Stroke Healthcare Impact Bond (here fter H&S) is based on
an outcomes-p yment approach to fund a lifestyle cha ge program, the Community Hypert nsion
Preve tion Initi tive (CHPI), with the aim to prevent pre-hypertensive senio s progr ssing to full
hypertens on [58]. T program was developed in collaboration with the MaRS Discovery District
and Heart and Stroke Foundation and has been offered in communities across Toronto since June
2017, and Vancouver since October 2018 [57,59]. The H&S HIB has been promoted under the form of
a community hypertension prevention initiative and was launched by the Heart and Stroke Foundation
using a SIB model to deliver services to residents of Ontario and British Columbia aged 60 or older
through health coaches, online tracking tools, and referrals to community resources such as exercise
clubs and cooking classes [59]. The main involved partners are summarized in Table 2.
The initiative enrolled 7000 pre-hypertensive Canadians in a six-month program to help them
adopt healthy behaviors and control their blood pressure [16]. The project was developed at the
federal level and the Heart and Stroke Foundation—in collaboration with the MaRS Centre for Impact
Investing and the Public Health Agency of Canada—attracted 11 investors [59]. The Heart and Stroke
Foundation is a Canadian charity focused on preventing heart disease and stroke, which represent
the main causes of hospitalization and death for Canadians. Investor capital to HSF and outcome
payments to investors flow through a trustee (Figure 2).
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Table 2. Involved partners in the H&S HIB.
Outcome Founder Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC)
Service Provider Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada
Independent evaluator The Social Research and Demonstration Corporation
Investors Foundations, high-net-worth individuals, and companies
Project development & performance advisor MaRS Centre for Impact Investing
Legal advisor Miller Thomson LLP
Source: Our elaboration from publicly available information.
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The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada
(HSF) decided to evaluate the effect of the program by comparing the results achieved with a historic
population baseline rather than with a control group. As clarified by MaRS [59,60], in the H&S HIB,
the commissioner (PHAC) is not motivated by public savings and due to this, payments are not related
to a mere saving object [60]. The project is based around two main metrics: the intake volume metric
and the blood pressure metric. The first is calculated by considering the number of people who submit
to a blood pressure reading and sign up for the program, while the second is based on the average
change in blood pressure across all participants after six months [59].
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• Rock t S ie ce, who pro ded support in managing t e pr curement of the service providers;
• NHS North East Quality Observatory System (NEQOS), who analyzed local data on long term
conditions and provided support in identifying promising areas for cost savings; and
• Vital Services North East, who developed the management information systems and the IT
infra-structure [63].
Table 3 provides an overview of the main involved partners.
Table 3. Involved partners in the Ways to Wellness HIB.
Commissioner Newcastle Gateshead CCG (the CCG)
Outcome payers Newcastle Gateshead CCG (the CCG), Big Lottery Fund, Commissioning Better Outcomes(CBO) Fund, and the Cabinet Office’s Social Outcomes Fund (SOF)
Service Provider
Lead service provider: Ways to Wellness
Subcontractors: First Contact Clinical, Mental Health Concern, Healthworks Newcastle,
Changing Lives
Investment manager Bridges Fund Management
Investors Bridges Fund Management through its Social Impact Bond and Social Entrepreneurs Fund
Intermediaries/consultancies Social Finance UK, Rocket Science, NHS North East Quality Observatory System (NEQOS),Vital Services North East
Source: Our elaboration of publicly available information.
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The deal was led through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) named Ways to Wellness Limited,
which was established to operate as the prime contractor supervising the delivery of the program by
the four local providers with a board that included members of Bridges Fund Management (BFM),
Newcastle West CCG, and VONNE (Voluntary Organizations’ Network North East). BFM have
provided upfront finance to the SPV [10,65] (Figure 4).
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t c t it t e c tl t li
Group and will be d termined on the basis of long-term savings related to the reduction
of hospital services. Public savings were est mated for CCG to be £10.8 m, while the estimated broader
public service savings were £13.6 m [10,64,65]. The project is structured around two outcom meas res:
- Outcome A: based on a change in wellbeing measured on the basis of a ‘Wellbeing Star’ at 6-month
intervals. These outcomes are the main perfor ance measures in the first two years of the project,
with most of the funds coming from central govern ent sources in the early years; and
- Outcome B: based on a cohort reduction in secondary care compared with a counterfactual group.
Outcome B measurements are scheduled in the third year of the program from April 2018 and are
to be funded from local commissioning funds [10,65].
Overall, the total expected outcome payments made to Ways to Wellness in the first six years
are £8.2 m. For Outcome A, payments are related to the Wellbeing Star indicators, with payments
increasing incrementally up to £500 per beneficiary. The remaining payments are related to the
reduction in secondary care costs (Outcome B), for which the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG)
will pay a maximum of £330 per annum in the case that the success targets are achieved [58].
From a financial point of view, Tan et al. [65] classified the Way to Wellness HIB as a fully at-risk
investment without a no fixed coupon or a secured level of return.
4.3. Mental Health and Employment Social Impact Bond
The Mental Health and Employment Social Impact Bond (SIB) addresses the employment support
needs of 2500 individuals living with severe mental health illness, based on having an employment
advisor embedded in local mental health professional teams. The project was developed around the
Mental Health and Employment Partnership (MHEP), a vehicle through which local commissioners of
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mental health supported employment services can procure a specialist intervention named “Individual
Placement and Support” (IPS).
MHEP was established by Social Finance using the social investment partnership (SIP) model with
an initial investment of £400,000 from Big Issue Invest, which retains 100% of the ownership [63,64].
MHEP supported the commissioning of three year IPS service contracts with three local public
entities: the Staffordshire County Council (Staffordshire), London Borough of Haringey (Haringey),
and Tower Hamlets Clinical Commissioning Group (Tower Hamlets) [66]. Under this arrangement,
MHEP makes available a ready-to-use flexible contract that is able to provide different contractual
arrangements according to each commissioner’s needs [67]. Consequently, the deal is characterized
by different contracting models at the local level (Figure 5). The direct costs of designing the SIB
were £150 k, which corresponded to the cost of the grant that Social Finance received from the CBO
Fund [66].
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The main partners involved are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4. Partners involved in the Mental Health and Employment HIB.
Commissioners Staffordshire County Council, London Borough of Haringey, Tower Hamlets ClinicalCommissioning Group, Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund, Social Outcomes Fund
Intermediary Social Finance (model development and contract management)
Investor Big Issue Invest
Source: Our elaboration on publicly available information.
The rationale for the Social Outcome Fund paying for the outcomes is that they reflect savings to
central government, while the rationale for the Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund is related to
the potential for social impact on the service users, for engaging with local providers, and for scaling,
replication, and generating impactful learning [66].
Table 5 provides an overview of the outcome payment scheme.
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Table 5. The outcome payment scheme in the Mental Health and Employment HIB.
Successful Engagement
of Users
Job Entry Outcome Job Sustainment Outcome
(<16 Hours/Week) (>16 Hours/Week) (<16 Hours/Week) (>16 Hours/Week)
Outcome
payment £790–£1000 £700 £1350 £1400 £1650
Payment
made by
MHEP/Big Issue Invest (20%)
Commissioner (70%)
Social Outcome
Fund/Commissioning Better
Outcomes Fund (10%)
Social Outcome
Fund/Commissioning
Better Outcomes
Fund (100%)
Social Outcome
Fund/Commissioning
Better Outcomes
Fund (100%)
Social Outcome
Fund/Commissioning
Better Outcomes
Fund (100%)
Social Outcome
Fund/Commissioning
Better Outcomes
Fund (100%)
Source: MHEP [67] (p. 5).
4.4. The Reconnections Social Impact Bond
The Reconnections Social Impact Bond aims to reduce loneliness and isolation for 3000 people
over the age of 50 in Worcestershire. The SIB was commissioned by the Worcestershire County Council
(WCC) with three co-commissioners from Clinical Commissioning Groups. NESTA, an innovation
foundation-based in the UK, is the main funder and Age UK Herefordshire and Worcestershire is
the main service provider [68]. The development of the Reconnections Social Impact Bond will lead
to savings of £3 million to the public purse over a 15-year period, while the costs of development
were around £189,000 [16]. The Reconnection deal is characterized by the presence of a principal
commissioner (Worcestershire County Council) and three co-commissioners (Clinical Commissioning
Groups, CCGs) [68]. Age UK H&W were the prime contractor for the service and there were six
subcontracted local service providers (of which Age UK H&W was one) to carry out the intervention
while Social Finance provided the operational support and outcomes monitoring for the SIB [10,65].
The main partners involved in the Reconnections SIB are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Partners involved in the Reconnection HIB.
Commissioners
Worcestershire County Council
Clinical Commissioning Groups (South Worcestershire CCG, Redditch and
Bromsgrove CCG and Wyre Forest CCG)
Service provider
Lead service provider: Age UK Herefordshire and Worcestershire
Subcontracted service providers: Age UK Herefordshire and Worcestershire,
Age UK Malvern, Onside Advocacy, Rooftop, Simply Limitless, Worcester
Community Trust
Intermediary Social Finance
Investor Care and Wellbeing Fund Nesta Impact Investments Age UK
Source: our elaboration on publicly available information.
From a contractual perspective, the Reconnections SIB is managed by Reconnections Ltd. (the
SPV) owned by the investors (Nesta Impact Investments, the Care and Wellbeing Fund), and managed
by Social Finance) and Age UK [68].
The contractual structure is summarized in Figure 6.
The maximum amount of outcome payments related to the Reconnections SIB is £2.02 million,
which can be broken down as follows: £697,000 from the Social Outcome Fund; £1.02 million from the
Commissioner; and £303,000 from the Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund.
The cost of developing the SIB was £189,000 including a £90,000 grant from the Department
of Health to carry out the cost–benefit analysis of the project; £64,000 from the Development Grant
from the Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund to help develop the project; and a £35,000 in-kind
contribution from the WCC linked to staff time undertaken to further develop the SIB [68].
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With regard to the possibility of driving welfare initiatives through SIBs by moving from an initial
govern ental policy, both Canada and the UK have gradually developed their legal frameworks in
order to facilitate the proliferation of these kinds of instruments.
With regard to Canada, the H&S HIB has been launched under a community prevention progra
by the Public Health Agency. The country’s interest in SIBs is contained in Canada’s 2012 Economic
Action Plan, which called for greater exploration of the potential of SIBs [6,69,70]. In October 2013,
the Minister for Employment and Social Development Canada announced Canada’s first social finance
pilot projects and several provincial governments have undertaken or are exploring social financing
models such as Alberta’s Social Innovation Fund, Ontario’s development of social i pact bond pilot
projects, and Saskatchewan’s appointment of a legislative secretary for social impact bonds [71–75].
At the federal level, the government first identified an interest in social finance in Budget 2011
and made further references to social finance in subsequent budgets, and in 2012 issued a “call for
concepts” for social finance ideas, and has since initiated some tentative experiments with social finance
approaches [70,74].
With regard to the UK, between 2017 and 2018, five new HIBs were launched, with programs
spanning end-of-life care (Your Life Line 24/7) and HIV prevention and treatment (launched by the
Elton John AIDS Foundation) to learning disabilities (‘Positive Behavioral Support’ (PBS) in Bradford)
and diabetes prevention (Healthier Devon). Since 2010, the United Kingdom has developed a strategy
framework for social investing [65,76,77] by developing and launching several market-building
initiatives, such as an independent financial institution (Big Society Capital) that was established to
develop and shape a sustainable social investment market. Since 2012, the Big Lottery Fund, which
is a non-departmental public body responsible for distributing funds raised by the National Lottery
for “good causes”, and the Cabinet Office started working together to support the development of
more innovative approaches to improve social outcomes by developing the Cabinet Office’s Social
Outcomes Fund and the Big Lottery Fund’s Commissioning Better Outcomes with the joint mission to
support the development of more SIBs [78]. An overview of the UK Government Outcomes Funds for
the development of SIBs is provided in Table 7.
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Table 7. UK Government outcomes funds for SIBs.
Fund Description
Social Outcomes Fund and
Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund
(Cabinet Office and Big Lottery Fund)
The Social Outcomes Fund (£20 m) and Commissioning Better Outcomes
(£40 m) were established by the Cabinet Office and the Big Lottery Fund
with the aim to support the development of SIBs in policy areas by
providing support/funding in the development stage and by paying for
a part of the outcomes payments. Commissioning Better Outcomes was
been set up by the Big Lottery Fund. The Social Outcomes Fund is
a Government (Cabinet Office) funded initiative.
Life Chances Fund (Department for
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport)
The Life Chances Fund provides support for locally commissioned SIBs
that tackle complex social issues and have been committed by central
government to contribute to outcome payments for payments by results
(PbR) schemes which involve socially minded investors. The LCF will aim
for contributions of around 20 per cent of total outcomes payments,
with local commissioners paying for the majority of the
outcomes payments.
Youth Engagement Fund (Department
for Work and Pensions)
The Youth Engagement Fund is a £16 million PbR fund that was
established by DWP and the Cabinet Office to help disadvantaged young
people aged 14 to 17 to participate and succeed in education or training.
Fair Chance Fund (Department for
Communities and Local Government
and Cabinet Office)
The Fair Chance Fund is used to fund seven Social Impact Bonds (SIBs)
focused on improving outcomes for young homeless people.
The Rough Sleeping SIB Fund
(Department for Communities and Local
Government)
The fund aims to help long-term rough sleepers with complex needs over
3 years: 2016 to 2017, 2017 to 2018, and 2018 to 2019.
Innovation Fund (Department for Work
and Pensions)
The Innovation Fund (IF) pilot was delivered between April 2012 and
November 2015 to support young people aged 14 or over who were
considered disadvantaged or at risk of disadvantage. The IF pilot was
comprised of ten projects, which were commissioned in two rounds.
Source: Our elaboration from publicly available information.
In the same vein, in 2013 the project “Trailblazers”, which included nine projects across England,
received seed funding from the government’s Social Enterprise Investment Fund to evaluate and
potentially develop SIB projects [76]. Table 8 provides an overview of the nine projects.
Table 8. “Trailblazers” projects.
Project Intervention Area Result
Sandwell and Birmingham End of life services Not commissioned.
Cornwall Frail older people with LTCs at risk ofemergency admission Not commissioned.
East Lancashire Isolation, unemployment and poorquality of life
Not commissioned (the service has been
funded outside a PbR scheme).
Leeds Nursing care for people withneurological trauma Not commissioned.
Manchester Behavioral interventions for children In progress.
Newcastle Better self-management of long-termconditions through social prescribing In progress.
Shared Lives Alternative to care homes for people inneed for intensive support
Two SIBs were signed and are under
development in Lambeth and
Manchester (from 2015), and Haringey
and Thurrock (from 2017).
Thames Reach Personalized service pathwayfor homeless In progress.
Worcester Loneliness among older people throughtailored support In progress.
Source: Adapted from Fraser et al. [10] and Tan et al. [65].
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The analysis of our cases allowed for the identification of three different contractual models. In the
H&S HIB, investor capital to HSF and outcome payments to investors flow through a trustee and the
entire deal is arranged around two main contracts: the first, a contribution agreement between the
PHAC and HSF, and the second, a loan agreement between HSF and the investors. In the Ways to
Wellness and Reconnection HIBs, the deals are led through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) (owned
by the investors, in the second case) while in the Mental Health and Employment HIB, the deal is
arranged around the Mental Health and Employment Partnership (MHEP) by using a social investment
partnership (SIP) model. The SIP model has led to the development of different local business models
by promoting the possibility of replicating the same intervention scheme at different local levels and
by promoting the collaboration between different public authorities. Table 9 provides an overview of
the core aspects of our analysis.
Table 9. A comparison of the case studies.
H&S HIB Ways to Wellness HIB Mental Health &Employment HIB Reconnection HIB
Contractual model Two different contracts andpresence of a trustee Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
(a) Social Investment
Partnership (SIP) model,
(b) Different local
business models.
Special purpose vehicle (SPV)
owned by the investors.
Project
commissioner Public Health Agency
The HIB has been
commissioned by Newcastle
Gateshead CCG (the CCG) that
received from Big Lottery Fund,
Commissioning Better
Outcomes (CBO) Fund and the
Cabinet Office’s Social
Outcomes Fund (SOF) ‘top-up’
payments to help cover some of
the outcome payments.
Different local public
authorities.
The Reconnections deal is
characterized by the presence of
a primary commissioner
(Worcestershire County Council)
and three co-commissioners
(Clinical Commissioning Groups,
CCGs) that help to ensure
a joined up and
multiagency approach.
Collaboration
between different
public authorities
The project was developed at the
federal level around the
collaboration between the Public
Health Agency and the Heart and
Stroke Foundation.
The deal is developed around
the collaboration between
a local authority and the
outcome funds.
The deal is developed
around the collaboration
between local and central
authorities.
The deal is developed around the
collaboration between a local
authority with three
co-commissioners.
Predefined level
of public savings
(a) The deal is not related to
a predefined level of public
savings.
(a) The deal is related to
a predefined level of
public savings.
(a) The deal is related to
a predefined level of
public savings.
(a) The deal is related to
a predefined level of
public savings.
Financial advisor MaRS (model development andcontract management).
Social Finance UK (model
development and contract
management).
Social Finance UK (model
development and
contract management).
Social Finance UK (model
development and contract
management).
Investors Businesses, charitable foundations,and wealthy individuals. Bridges Fund Management. Big Issue Invest.
Care and Wellbeing Fund; Nesta
Impact Investments; Age UK.
Rate of return
• 6.7 percent return on
investment if the project
meets its targets;
• >8.8 percent profit if it
exceeds the target.
- if the project meets its
targets, the estimated
money multiple over
seven years will be
c. 1.38 times the
initial investment;
- if the outcomes achieved
are lower than the base
case, the multiple could
be much lower and
conceivably all
investment could be lost.
Data not
provided/unconfirmed. Data not provided/unconfirmed.
Source: Our elaboration from publicly available information.
From Table 9, it is interesting to note that all of the analyzed cases were built around a series of
collaborations between different kind of partners including foundations, outcome funds, and public
authorities at both the central and local level.
6. Enabling Factors
Currently, no large SIBs have been commissioned and are still at a relatively small scale in terms
of lives touched (beneficiaries) and capital [79,80].
SIBs have also been the object of strong criticism due, for example, to a lack of evidence regarding
their effectiveness [80] and for the “win–win narrative” through which they have been promoted
in many countries [21]. Skepticism also lies in the absence of compelling supporting evidence,
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to the presence of high transaction costs [20,80], or to ethical issues such as the “financialization” or
“marketization” of social policies [28,61,80,81].
On the other hand, academics and practitioners have widely recognized some key aspects
that should be considered for the development of SIBs. In this vein, for example, Giantris and
Pinakiewicz [82] (p. 35) clarified that the first step for the implementation of a SIB financing scheme
was to understand the risk trade-offs that underpin it and in particular, the potential for measurable
social impact and the possibility of identifying and capturing the economic value of social impact;
the financial and reputational risk (and return) for each of the involved parties; the transaction,
execution, governance, and due diligence costs; the cost of capital to the commissioner and service
provider(s); the legal framework and the changes in procurement and contracting systems; and the
potential for replication and scaling.
The analysis of our case studies led us to catch a series of enabling factors that could potentially
promote the development of both SIBs and HIBs and their scalability/replicability.
6.1. Building the Market Space: The Role of Governmental Policies
The experiences of Canada and the UK demonstrate that the vivacity of the SIB market—
considering that these two countries cover 42% of the global market—is strongly influenced by the
development of policies that recognize the importance of social finance. In this sense, since 2010,
several market-building initiatives have been launched including an independent financial institution
(Big Society Capital), and since 2012, the Big Lottery Fund and the Cabinet Office have started working
together to support the development of more innovative approaches to improving social outcomes by
developing the Cabinet Office’s Social Outcomes Fund and the Big Lottery Fund’s Commissioning
Better Outcomes. In the same vein, since 2012, Canada has developed an “Economic Action Plan”,
which calls for greater exploration of the potential of SIBs. All of these initiatives summarize the
interest in the development of innovative funding schemes starting from the central level, followed by
the local authorities (e.g., the Government of Alberta).
Moreover, both these countries have social finance intermediaries and social impact/outcomes
funds that help the improvement of single deals. The role of “financial infrastructure” is also highlighted
by Albertson et al. [76], who clarified how social finance intermediaries were often able to provide
technical assistance in the project development and implementation phases. At the same time, and as
emerged from our cases, social outcome funds represent the primary funders of SIBs (especially in the
UK), thus overcoming the need to find other financial resources.
6.2. Improving Scalability and Replicability through Robust Contractual Schemes
The fact that SIBs are not a bond or a debt instrument in the traditional sense has been widely
clarified in the academic literature [13,16,83]. Under a financial point of view, a SIB contract implies
a series of social/economic futures contracts between the involved parties [79]. The contractual scheme
is at the center of the partnership and defines the relationship between the parties, their respective
rights and responsibilities, allocates risk, and provides mechanisms for dealing with change. A
well-defined contractual scheme should create certainty where possible, and bounded flexibility where
needed, thereby retaining clarity and limiting uncertainty for both parties. The possibility of testing
and developing new forms of contractual schemes that best fit the needs of both public and private
parties could improve the development of the SIB/HIB market. At the same time, contractual schemes
set the boundaries under which public sector and private entities cooperate and share risks and profits
to provide the predefined services.
SIBs require the careful analysis of risks by the private and public sector. From this perspective,
SIBs consist of the allocation of risks among parties by means of the proper design of contract
agreements, consequently, the allocation of risks cannot be separated from an analysis of the contracting
terms between the parties.
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Simultaneously, risk transfer from the government to the private sector is crucial if SIB projects
are to be cost-effective. For these reasons, if contracts are the basis upon which risks are allocated,
then risk transfer is also a function of the forms of contracts. From these perspectives, standardization
and modularity represent the two main factors that could lead the development of the SIB approach
for welfare service provision by stimulating the interests of private counterparties.
In SIB contracts, the principal and agent could potentially have conflicting interests regarding
the quality of service that should be achieved and the costs that should be incurred. Moreover,
given the complexity of such contracts, audits and controls can be costly and very difficult to perform.
This context makes more difficult to rely on a sole ex-ante competition to ensure that the ex-ante
contracting on and the ex post delivery of service will be optimal. The competition for complex projects
such as SIBs could be insufficient, with the potential effect that ex ante competition fails to guarantee
the optimal value for money, especially when the contract is characterized by significant complexity
and strong uncertainty. For these reasons, the question of the legislative environment represents one
of the most important aspects that need to be developed. In this sense, the international experiences
reveal that SIBs are usually developed by using the recurrent model “with SPV” that has led to the
transfer of financial risks to a new venture created ad hoc for the development of the project. Moreover,
the Canadian experience shows that relationships with the involved parties can be further regulated
by using only two different contractual models: an investor agreement and a contribution agreement.
The question of aligned interests could be further analyzed as viewed by the UK experiences for
two main reasons. First of all, HIBs, and in particular the cases of Tower Hamlets and Staffordshire,
can be developed by using the same overall arrangements, but by making several adjustments at
the local level. This implies that both the central and the local government work together for the
implementation of the project and that a big deal developed and projected at the central level can
become scalable at several levels. At the same time, this kind of structure involves parties that have,
at different levels, the same interests. Second, from the UK experience, it is possible to note that all
the involved parties, considering for example the MHEP case, have a sort of aligned interest in the
success of the program including investors that in some cases are represented by social investment
funds. The fact that in the analyzed cases where retail investors were not involved, can be intended as
an opportunity to avoid the problems of aligned interest at least in this market development phase.
In considering the role of robust contractual schemes, it is interesting to underline that in line with
Edmiston and Nicholls [7] and Sinclair et al. [80], our cases revealed that in many cases, funders
and intermediaries were heavily involved in the design of the initiatives they chose to finance. This
seems to confirm the idea of La Torre et al. [18], who highlighted the role of SIBs as a “cross-sector
partnership for sustainability” by stressing the concept that a fully collaborative partnership between
all the involved parties may reduce the risk of failure.
6.3. Institutional Variables and the Role of Partnerships for Sustainability
A mix of exogenous conditions, i.e., severe public budget constraints and the emerging attitude of
public authorities toward the provision of public services under the core idea that the mix of quality and
efficiency is made possible by the involvement of the private sector in intervention areas traditionally
confined to public budget spending, can be considered as replicability and scalability ingredients.
By the term “institutional variables”, we refer to aspects such as the interests of public authorities at
different governmental levels (local, regional, central) and their collaboration toward general objectives
(for example, in the case of MHEP), the presence of an attitude toward efficiency and effectiveness
in the provision of services, the attention toward themes such as the sustainability of public finance
and accountability. The relationship between institutional variables and the development of SIBs
is important for governments because if the public authorities have the right attitude toward them,
arguably more SIBs would be developed in that country. However, the relationship is also important
for the private parties as only when a good level of institutional interest toward the development of
these particular financial schemes is present in a country will they arguably be inclined to offer their
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services and financing to such partnerships. The main implication of the institutional attention toward
SIBs can be confirmed by the flourishing of initiatives aimed at promoting a social finance ecosystem
(including financial intermediaries and outcome funds).
Governments, given their strict budget constraints, have significantly reduced the overall welfare
expenditure. Under this perspective, SIBs could potentially increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of the public sector in order to transfer, ceteris paribus, more risk to private parties and by reducing
future avoidable costs and inefficiency.
6.4. Dampening the Role of Evaluation and Public Savings
As clarified by Cooper et al. [79], SIBs rely on a series of accounting aspects including budgets,
future cashflows, discounting, performance measurement, and auditing by representing a potentially
powerful and problematic use of accounting to enact government policy. Academic literature has
widely recognized the general lack of successful evaluation practices by noting the importance of
the identification of high-quality approaches for the development of the SIB market. The question of
evaluation can be analyzed from many perspectives. First of all, if we consider the public sector side,
the question of evaluation can be analyzed under the lens of “How much could I save by improving a social
impact bond compared to a traditional procurement scheme?”. In this sense, the question of evaluation can
be reduced to the type of tools that can currently be used in the public sector including cost–benefit
analysis and value for money methodologies. Previous works have suggested that SIBs are improved
only by considering social issues and programs where it is possible to have measurable and achievable
results (outcomes).
However, based on the Canadian experience, it is interesting to note that the core idea of the H&S
SIB is to emancipate outcome payments from public savings with the aim to make the contractual
structure more flexible. From a public perspective, the idea to develop a HIB project without building
outcome metrics around the boundaries of cost saving could be potentially justified under the aims
of preventing a predefined or emerging health problem by considering a reduction in future costs
for hospitalization and that an increased overall level of wellbeing represents a superior approach to
health protection.
7. Conclusions
Economic shocks pose severe threats to healthcare systems by heightening fiscal pressure and
stretching government resources while at the same time people rely more heavily on publicly financed
health services. Essentially, the crisis has given substance to an old and often hypothetical debate
about the sustainability of welfare systems, and, in particular, of health expenditure.
To bridge their huge funding gaps, welfare systems and governments across the world are
increasingly searching for alternative financial schemes in line with the growing needs of the
sustainability of public expenditure. Since 2010, 25 countries have developed welfare projects
by using SIBs as a new and emerging social finance instrument that supports public sector initiatives
by sharing the project risks with the private sector. SIBs have been seen as one instrument for
overcoming certain barriers to scale as they combine the competencies, experiences, and financial
resources of different actors to address difficult and pressing social issues. However, aspects such as
risk, governance, information asymmetries, and misaligned interests between the involved parties
have been underlined by the academic literature. However, the question that has emerged is whether
it is right to consider only the problem of transaction costs, or alternatively, can transaction costs be
mitigated by factors such as the level of social innovation achieved, the quality of the service provided,
and the possibility of transferring the financial and reputational risks to the private sector. Currently,
the feasibility of improving SIBs is constrained by issues of replicability across scale, sustainability
over time, and inadequate market linkages. The development of a SIB market requires the creation
of an enabling environment built around a series of ingredients. Our study provides a preliminary
theorization of the main enabling factors that could potentially contribute to the development of SIBs
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as sustainable welfare instruments. Comparisons across the four cases were made to determine where
similarities and differences existed and to identify several enabling factors. In particular, the four
case studies made it apparent that there was (1) the possibility of driving welfare initiatives through
SIBs by moving from an initial governmental policy; and (2) the possibility that particular contractual
schemes could improve the scalability and replicability of SIBs. The use of scalable and replicable
frameworks could potentially facilitate the implementation of SIB projects and therefore increase
the likelihood of achieving value for money for the public sector. Future research directions could
expand our understanding of the enabling factors by building a library of standard SIB types with
groupings of type specific terms, conditions, protocols, and lessons learned. At the same time, further
studies could try to develop a dashboard that is useful for the evaluation of the appropriateness of
the SIB as well as try to analyze all of the contractual models detected though our analysis under
the lens of the risks detected by all of the involved stakeholders and how they are managed under
a principal–agent perspective.
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